Public sectorAI engineering
The EU AI Act for public bodies: what a Malaysian AI provider must prepare by December 2027
Public bodies in the EU that deploy high-risk AI face their heaviest duties from 2 December 2027, while the bans, the literacy duty and the transparency rules already bind them. This article sets out the 2026 amendments, what an EU public deployer must do, and what a Malaysian company supplying AI to such a body has to prepare: the reach of Article 2, an authorised representative in the Union and the documentation the deployer’s impact assessment relies on.
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- FromNine editorial team
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Key takeaways
- The bans on prohibited practices and the AI literacy duty took effect on 2 February 2025; the Article 50 transparency rules followed on 2 August 2026.
- Since the 2026 amendments, high-risk systems listed in Annex III are regulated from 2 December 2027. From then, an EU public deployer must assess the impact on fundamental rights and register its use in the EU database before switching a system on.
- A provider in Malaysia falls under the Act when it places a system on the EU market or when the system’s output is used in the EU. For high-risk systems it appoints an authorised representative in the Union and equips the deployer with what it needs.
Contents
Where the AI Act stands in late 2026
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the AI Act (opens external site), entered into force at the start of August 2024, with its parts applying in phases. A July 2026 amending act, known as the Digital Omnibus on AI and published as Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (opens external site), moved the high-risk dates back and changed a number of other articles. It took effect on 27 July 2026, shortly ahead of the date on which the high-risk rules would first have applied.
So some duties are already live, a further set arrives in December 2026, and the most demanding ones for public deployers come in December 2027.
| Date | What starts | Meaning for a public body and its provider |
|---|---|---|
| 2 February 2025 | Bans on prohibited practices (Article 5); AI literacy (Article 4) | No prohibited use, such as social scoring, may continue or begin. Staff are helped to understand the AI they work with. |
| 2 August 2025 | General-purpose AI model rules; governance and penalties | Mostly duties for model providers. Member States designate their competent authorities. |
| 2 August 2026 | Most other provisions, including Article 50 transparency | Where Article 50 applies, people learn that they are talking to AI or looking at content it generated. |
| 2 December 2026 | New bans on AI-made intimate images without consent and on AI-made child abuse imagery; end of the grace period for labelling synthetic output of systems placed on the market earlier | Review the generative tools in use and in procurement. |
| 2 December 2027 | Annex III high-risk regime starts | Deployer duties apply, with an impact assessment and an EU database entry needed before use. |
| 2 August 2028 | Annex I high-risk regime starts (AI in regulated products) | Matters where AI forms part of a regulated product, for example a medical device or machinery. |
The Omnibus also rewrote the AI literacy article. Providers and deployers are now obliged to support their staff’s AI literacy through measures, instead of guaranteeing that staff reach an adequate level. The duty survives; the proof expected of you has changed. Training that fits each role, and attendance records, remains the sensible response.
When the Act reaches a provider in Malaysia
The AI Act is not limited to companies inside the EU. Article 2(1)(a) brings in providers that place AI systems on the EU market or put them into service there, wherever they are established. Article 2(1)(c) adds providers and deployers located in a third country where the output of their AI system is used in the Union. A Malaysian software company that develops a system for an EU public body, or operates a service whose output an EU agency relies on, may therefore be a provider under the Act.
For high-risk systems, a provider established outside the Union must, before making the system available on the EU market, appoint by written mandate an authorised representative established in the Union (Article 22). The representative keeps the provider’s documentation at the disposal of the authorities and cooperates with them.
At home, Malaysia’s National Guidelines on AI Governance and Ethics (AIGE) are voluntary guidance, and the National Artificial Intelligence Office (NAIO) was launched under the Ministry of Digital on 12 December 2024. Neither changes what an EU public body will ask of you. Those requirements come from EU law and apply because of where the system is used.
Provider or deployer?
An EU public body is usually a deployer, using an AI system under its own authority. Whoever develops a system, or has one developed, and places it on the market or puts it into service under its own name is the provider. A Malaysian company that builds and supplies the system is usually the provider; so is a public body that has a system built to its own specification and runs it under its own name.
Roles can move. Article 25 turns a deployer into a provider when it substantially modifies a high-risk system, or repurposes a system in a way that makes it high-risk. Put the intended roles in the tender documents and the contract, so that neither side learns of them from an auditor.
Which uses count as high-risk?
Annex III names the areas where AI systems count as high-risk. For public bodies, these matter most:
- Public services and benefits: deciding who is eligible, and granting, cutting, withdrawing or recovering benefits and services.
- Migration, asylum and borders, policing and the courts.
- Education and training: admissions, grading of learning outcomes, and monitoring during examinations.
- Work: hiring, promotion, allocating tasks and monitoring staff, since public bodies employ people too.
- Critical infrastructure: components that keep digital networks, roads and utility supply safe.
An Annex III area does not settle the matter. Article 6(3) excludes a system whose risk of harm is not significant, for example because it handles a narrow procedural step, refines a result a person has already produced, spots patterns without replacing human judgement, or does preparatory work. Any system that profiles people stays high-risk. A provider or body relying on the exclusion should write down why.
Plenty of useful tools fall outside high-risk altogether: drafting help, internal knowledge search, translation, summaries. The GDPR and the transparency rules still reach them, but the high-risk obligations do not.
Figure 1
Read the diagram as text
2 February 2025: the bans and the literacy duty. 2 August 2025: rules for general-purpose models, and governance. 2 August 2026: the bulk of the remaining articles, including transparency.
2 December 2026: new bans, and labelling of synthetic output required for older systems too. 2 December 2027: the Annex III high-risk regime, the main date for EU public deployers. 2 August 2028: the Annex I regime for AI in regulated products.
What an EU public deployer must do, and what it needs from you
From 2 December 2027, an EU public body using an Annex III high-risk system carries the duties of Article 26 (opens external site). In summary:
- Run the system the way the provider’s instructions describe, with suitable technical and organisational measures.
- Give oversight to competent, trained people with the authority to act, and support them.
- Make sure input data under its control fits the purpose and represents the cases the system will meet.
- Monitor performance and warn both provider and authorities without delay about risks and serious incidents.
- Retain the logs the system generates automatically for six months at least, unless other EU or national law sets a different period.
- Tell workers’ representatives and the staff concerned before a high-risk system is used in the workplace.
- Record its use in the EU database before going live, which public authorities must do (Articles 26(8) and 49); a system not registered may not be used.
- Inform individuals when a high-risk system decides, or helps decide, something about them (Article 26(11)); Article 86 gives them a right to an explanation.
Several of these duties depend on the provider. The deployer cannot follow instructions for use it never received, keep logs it cannot reach, or report a serious incident the provider did not tell it about. Expect each of these to appear in the contract.
The fundamental rights impact assessment
Article 27 (opens external site) obliges public-law bodies, and private firms that deliver public services, to assess the effect on fundamental rights before deploying most Annex III systems for the first time; systems for critical infrastructure are left out. The assessment sets out:
- the procedures in which the system will be used, consistent with its purpose;
- how long and how often it will be used;
- which people and groups it is likely to affect;
- the particular risks of harm to them;
- how human oversight works in practice;
- what happens when a risk materialises, including governance and complaint routes.
The deployer sends its findings to the market surveillance authority. Because the work overlaps with the DPIA required by GDPR Article 35, run the two side by side and reuse what you can. The AI Office is due to provide a template questionnaire under Article 27(5); find out whether it exists before designing your own. Some national methods exist already, the Dutch IAMA (Impact Assessment Mensenrechten en Algoritmes) among them.
The deployer writes the assessment, but much of its input comes from the provider: the intended purpose, known limitations, the populations the system was tested on, and how oversight is built in. A Malaysian provider can prepare that material once, as part of its technical documentation, so that each EU client’s assessment starts from facts rather than from a blank questionnaire.
Transparency duties in force today
Since 2 August 2026, Article 50 has bound both sides. A provider builds conversational systems so that users know they face AI, unless it is self-evident, and labels synthetic output in a form machines can detect. A deployer discloses deepfakes. It also discloses text that AI wrote or altered when the text informs the public on public-interest matters, except where a person reviewed it and editorial responsibility is held.
Public bodies meet this most often with a chatbot on their website or in a service channel. The chatbot should identify itself as AI, state the limits of what it handles, and hand over to staff on request.
A preparation plan for 2026 and 2027
- Take stock now. Record each AI system already running or being bought, including AI features in platforms already licensed, with owner, purpose, provider, data and the people affected.
- Classify by early 2027. Sort each system into banned, high-risk (keeping the Article 6(3) reasoning), transparency-only or minimal-risk, and note whether you are its provider or deployer.
- Settle the provider’s role. A provider outside the Union appoints its authorised representative, prepares the technical documentation and decides how logs and incident information reach each deployer.
- Fix contracts during 2027. Deployers require the instructions, the conformity papers and log access, and write the provider’s help with the impact assessment and with incident reports into the contract.
- Design oversight. Appoint the overseers, train them, let them override and escalate, and counter automation bias; our article on AI agents and the actions a person must approve shows one way.
- Log and monitor. Retain logs for no less than six months, and agree what a serious incident is and who files the report.
- Before go-live. Finish the rights assessment alongside the DPIA, make the EU database entry, and notify staff and those affected.
- Keep literacy current. Role-based courses for operators, reviewers and officials who decide, refreshed after system changes, with attendance kept on file.
Penalties and enforcement
Penalty rules are set by each Member State. Article 99(8) leaves each Member State to decide if, and to what extent, its own public authorities can be fined; the provision says nothing about their providers. That is no argument for delay. Supervisors can still demand corrections, and a public decision that nobody can explain or contest loses its legitimacy.
What to watch in the coming months
- Commission guidance under Article 6(5) on what counts as high-risk, next to the existing guidelines on prohibited practices (opens external site).
- Harmonised standards for the high-risk requirements, the main route by which providers will show conformity.
- The supervisors each Member State appoints, and the first guidance they give public deployers.
- The AI Office’s questionnaire template for the rights impact assessment.
The Commission’s AI Act Service Desk (opens external site) maintains the official timeline and explanations per article. Bookmark it, and put a date on each internal memo about the Act, since the text keeps changing.
Sources
- EUR-Lex. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (accessed )
- EUR-Lex. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI) (accessed )
- European Commission. AI Act: regulatory framework for AI (accessed )
- European Commission, AI Act Service Desk. Timeline for the implementation of the EU AI Act (accessed )
- European Commission, AI Act Service Desk. Article 26: Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systems (accessed )
- European Commission, AI Act Service Desk. Article 27: Fundamental rights impact assessment for high-risk AI systems (accessed )
- European Commission. Commission guidelines on prohibited artificial intelligence practices (accessed )
- European Commission. AI Act Service Desk (accessed )
- EUR-Lex. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), Article 35 (accessed )
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Supplying AI to a public body in the EU?
We help providers and public bodies take stock of their AI, sort each use by risk and build the oversight, logging and documentation the AI Act expects. Whether the Act applies to your system is for your counsel to judge.